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ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST CONSENT
DECREES BY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
AND CIVIL ACTIONS
The consent decree is presently the primary means of enforcing the antitrust
laws. While consent decrees are potentially effective to redress antitrust abuses,
a recent United States Supreme Court decision affirming a restrictive "con-
tract" interpretation of these decrees threatens to vitiate their usefulness. The
author examines the case law culminating in this decisidn and urges the adop-
tion of a more expansive "modified contract" analysis of the decree, and a
stiffening of penalties for noncompliance with decree terms.
I. INTRODUCTION
WHILE CONSENT DECREES' have become a major feature of
government antitrust enforcement, the effect of substituting
negotiated settlements for full adjudication remains something of a
mystery. Few question the convenience and timesaving aspect of the
consent decree system. Many writers, however, have criticized con-
sent decrees for creating barriers to private litigants2 and for not being
adequately enforced. 3
This Note analyzes two aspects of enforcing consent decrees. First,
the different approaches courts use to interpret disputed terms in
consent decrees will be reviewed. While many courts look to the
economic facts which prompted the decree,4 there has been a general
reluctance to use extrinsic evidence to interpret ambiguous terms.
Second, the Note will examine the adequacy of existing penalties for
I. The consent decree is an order of the court agreed upon by representatives of the
Attorney General and a defendant in proceedings initiated under the Sherman Act, the
Clayton Act, or related statutes. See ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, H.R. Doc. No.
13, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1959). There is no trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or
law regarding the conduct challenged by the government. Rather, the decree is a
negotiated compromise, later formalized before a federal district judge.
2. See Flynn, Consent Decrees in Antitrust Enforcement: Some Thoughts and
Proposals, 53 IOWA L. REV. 983 (1968); Phillips, The Consent Decree in Antitrust
Enforcement, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 39 (1961); Sullivan, Enforcement of Government
Antitrust Decrees by Private Parties: Third Party Beneficiary Rights and Intervenor
Status, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 822 (1975); Comment, Consent Decrees and the Private
Action: An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 627 (1965); Note, Consent Decrees and
Treble Damages: More Effective Enforcement, 4 GA. L. REV. 592 (1970); Note, Closing
An Antitrust Loophole: Collateral Effects for Nolo Pleas and Government Settlements,
55 VA. L. REV. 1334 (1969).
3. See note 22 infra.
4. See notes 44-56 infra and accompanying text.
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noncompliance and will suggest that judicial approaches to interpreting
consent decrees, as well as the structure of existing penalties and the
government's emphasis on criminal sanctions, have limited the effec-
tiveness of the consent-decree as a means for enforcing antitrust law.
At present, Congress has authorized. three groups to enforce the
antitrust laws. First, the Attorney General, through the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, is authorized to bring suit for injunctive
relief,5 civil damages, 6 and criminal sanctions. 7 Secondly, the Federal
Trade Commission may issue a cease and desist order8 for violation of
the Federal Trade Commission Act which prohibits unfair or deceptive
practices and unfair methods of competition.9 Finally, a private party
may sue to recover three times his actual damages plus costs of the
suit. l0
Antitrust proceedings, however, are complex, time consuming,
and costly to all parties involved." Thus, most cases are resolved by
negotiated settlement rather than by litigation. The Antitrust Division
settles 75 to 80 percent of all civil cases by means of consent decrees. '
2
Likewise, the FTC enters into consent orders far more often than it
litigates disputes.13
A consent decree shares aspects of both a contract and a judicial
order. Though negotiated, it is a final court order. It has res judicata
effect,' 4 but it does not serve as a judicial determination or admission
by the defendant that the conduct in question violates any existing
law.' 5 It can be attacked on appeal only for clerical error, fraud in the
procurement, lack of consent, or lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' 6
A consent decree also has the flexibility of a contract. With little or no
5. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970).
6. -Id. § 15a.
7. Id. §§ 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 13a, 21.
8. Id. § 45(b).
9. Id. § 451(a)(1).
10. Id. § 15.
11. Kilgore, Antitrust Judgements and Their Enforcement, 4 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J.
102, 105 (1954).
12. [1972] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 150,137.
13. Id. 50,138. At least 65 percent of all civil antitrust suits from 1915 to 1969
resulted in consent decrees. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.
L. & ECON. 365 (1970).
14. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D. Del. 1942)
(government not permitted to vacate a consent decree in order to get a stronger decree).
See Dabney, Antitrust Consent Decrees: How Protective an Umbrella?, 68 YALE L.J.
1391, 1397-99 n.24 (1959).
15. Paul M. Harrod Co. v. A.B. Dick Co., 194 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ohio 1961). See
Comment, supra note 2, at 644 n.90.
16. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928).
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judicial supervision, the parties are permitted wide latitude in negotiat-
ing the terms of the decree.' 7
In addition to the important savings in manpower and money, both
sides benefit from the flexibility inherent in the negotiating process.
The government may achieve concessions and agreements that might
not have been reached under the antitrust laws themselves, 18 while the
corporation may employ the consent decree to negotiate around activi-
ty prohibited by the antitrust laws, to shield itself from further govern-
ment suits, 19 to avoid the adverse publicity and uncertainty of complex
litigation, and, most importantly, to elude the ponderous reach of
section 5 of the Clayton Act. 20 Thus the consent decree strikes a
17. Flynn, supra note 2, at 989; Phillips, supra note 2, at 41.
18. Phillips, supra note 2, at 44. The consent decree may bring anticipated corporate
activity within the court's jurisdiction. The government may also use a decree to
proscribe activities throughout an entire industry. Finally, it is possible that a consent
order could serve as the basis of an FTC rule thereby establishing an industrywide
minimum standard.
19. Simco Sales Serv., Inc. v. Air Reduction Co., 213 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1963);
P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 58-59 (1974).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970), as amended by Act of Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528,
§ 2, 88 Stat. 1706. Under § 5, if the government obtains a "final judgment" against
a defendant, a private litigant suing for treble damages may introduce the prior judgment
as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation. Defining "final judgment" in 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(a) has been a major judicial undertaking. A plea of nolo contendere to a criminal
charge is not deemed a "final judgment," but a guilty plea is admissible as prima facie
evidence. E.g., Illinois v. Sperry Rand Corp., 237 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. Il. 1965). But see
Note, Government Contempt Order Provides Possible Prima Facie Case for Private
Antitrust Action, 8 UTAH L. REV. 274 (1963); Note, Closing an Antitrust Loophole:
Collateral Effect for Nolo Pleas and Government Settlements, 55 VA. L. REV. 1334
(1969); Comment, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 467 (1963).
After a long debate, FTC orders have been held to be within the scope of section 5 of
the Clayton Act. Purex Corp. Ltd. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal.
1970), aff'd, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972); Farmington
Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1969) (FTC cease and desist
order given prima facie effect); Carpenter v. Central Ark. Milk Producers Ass'n, [1966]
Trade Cas. 71,817, at 82,772 (W.D. Ark.) (FTC consent order negotiated while
appeals were pending held to be prima facie evidence); see Matteoni, An Antitrust
Argument: Whether a Federal Trade Commission Order is Within the Ambit of the
Clayton Act's Section 5, 40 NOTRE DAME LAW. 158 (1965).
Consent decrees entered "after testimony is taken" are admissible, but the private
litigant must make certain that the time covered by the decree and the nature of the
violation stated in the complaint are identical to the private litigant's action. See Webster
Rosewood Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1957),
aff'd, 263 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959). If the decree is entered
into before testimony is taken, it cannot be used as prima facie evidence and a third
party's chance for success in a § 5 treble damage action is accordingly diminished. 15
U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970). See Timberlake, The Use of Government Judgments or Decrees in
Subsequent Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 991
(1961).
The private litigant can use government discovery material, but most decrees are
entered before discovery begins, and the material on which the complaint is based
[Vol. 28:202
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delicate balance between legal and economic considerations on the one
hand, and the expectations of the parties on the other.
Once a consent decree is entered, enforcement of the decree rests
exclusively with the government. 2 1 Until recently, government en-
forcement has been limited by manpower constraints and highlighted
by general disorganization.
22
Since 1961, however, there has been a marked trend toward more
comprehensive enforcement of decrees. 23 Presently, if a violation is
suspected, the Antitrust Division conducts a preliminary inquiry to
remains confidential. Comment, supra note 2, at 650-51. See generally Loevinger,
Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167 (1958). Since
secrecy is one of the government's most important bargaining tools, it is not easily
relinquished. See Comment, supra note 2, at 637.
Some consent decrees contain clauses whereby the defendant admits to certain
antitrust violations. Third parties have attempted to invoke these admissions to circum-
vent the § 5 provision that consent decrees not be used as prima facie evidence in
private suits. Such efforts have met with little success. Courts have narrowly construed
the admission to apply only to later cases brought by local government entitites. United
States v. Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co. [1960] Trade Cas. 69,385, at 77,272 (D.
Mass.). In other instances, courts have simply barred private parties from use of such
"asphalt clauses." United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., [1961] Trade Cas. 69,923, at
77,641 (D. Mass. 1960); United States v. Bituminous Concrete Ass'n, [1960] Trade Cas.
t 69,878, at 77,486 (D. Mass.). See Kaplan, The Asphalt Clause-A New Weapon in
Antitrust Enforcement, 3 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 355 (1962). In such a situation, a
third party's only recourse is to register complaints with the government. Phillips, supra
note 2, at 51.
21. See notes 91-98 supra and accompanying text.
22. The general failure of the government to enforce decrees is such a
well-known phenomenon that a consent decree slap on the wrist and exhorta-
tion to go and sin no more may induce a sense of security on the part of
defendants; security to sin some more while the enemy rests on his consent
decree laurels.
Flynn, supra note 2, at 999.
Recent Senate oversight hearings on antitrust enforcement have disclosed that a
major impediment to successful enforcement is caused by the salary differential between
private sector and Antitrust Division attorneys. One former deputy assistant attorney
general described the situation as a "growing crisis" in antitrust enforcement. Both
Sides Agree: Feds No Match For Private Bar, 63 A.B.A.J. 785 (June, 1977).
23. Originally, the Antitrust Division reviewed industry surveys, trade journals, and
private complaints to identify possible violations of a consent decree. Phillips, supra
note 2, at 50-51; see Duncan, Post-Litigation Resulting From Alleged Non-Compliance
With Government Antitrust Consent Decrees, 8 W. RES. L. REV. 45, 54-55 (1956).
In 1961, as part of an experimental program, the Division referred 50 selected
judgments to the FTC for investigation of possible noncompliance. [1972] 5 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 50,137. The Antitrust Division, not satisfied with the results of this
experimental enforcement program, created a Judgments and Judgment Enforcement
Section to follow up on decrees. Id. The expanding Judgment Enforcement Section of
the Antitrust Division, in conjunction with the extensive investigatory powers of the
FTC, has brought more order to the enforcement area, although time and manpower
constraints still remain a problem. A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 385
(1970).
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determine the nature and extent of noncompliance. 24 Information is
gathered by the use of boilerplate visitation clauses which permit
reasonable access to the suspect's records and files. The Division then
prosecutes decree violations by civil and/or criminal contempt pro-
ceedings.2 ' The Federal Trade Commission enforces its consent orders
by civil actions under section 11 (a) of the Clayton Act26 and section
5 (a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.27 Under these provisions,
cumulative daily fines of $5,000 to $10,000 may be levied against a
defendant who fails to comply with the terms of the consent order. 28
II. THEORIES OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A contempt action to enforce a consent decree is theoretically no
different from any other action to compel a party to show why he
should not be punished for failing to obey the lawful order of a court.
In both instances the court has broad discretionary power to fashion
appropriate relief. 29 The dual character of a consent decree, part
judicial order and part contract, 30 has created problems for courts faced
with interpreting ambiguous terms in decrees and orders. The exis-
tence of a decree indicates questionable activity; from the viewpoint of
the government the decree expeditiously provides a means for correct-
ing the economic harm caused by the activity. 31 As a contract,
however, as opposed to a judicial order, the decree contains no find-
ings of fact, and presents a reviewing court with no substantial re-
cord. 2 If the scope of inquiry is allowed to extend beyond the express
terms of the decree, the court may ultimately review the merits of the
original suit, a result sought to be avoided by negotiated settlement.
Moreover, to find violations by looking beyond the express terms of
the decree to a sketchy factual record would add uncertainty to this
major area of antitrust law enforcement. A court must carefully inter-
pret decrees in order to strike the proper balance between the terms
bargained for by the parties and the economic purposes of the decree.
24. Kilgore, supra note 11, at 128.
25. Id.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (1970).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1970).
27. Id. § 45(a).
28. The court weighs factors such as evidence of bad faith, injury to the public, and
ability to pay to determine the exact amount of the fine. United States v. J.B. Williams
Co., 498 F.2d 414, 438-39 (2d Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 176-88 infra.
29. Kilgore, supra note 11, at 129-30. See also United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258
(1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
30. Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19-34
(1972). See text accompanying notes 14-16, supra.
31. Flynn, supra note 2, at 1003--04.
32. See id. at 990.
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A. The Contract Theory
Most courts, in striking this balance, have construed consent de-
crees by applying the traditional rules of contract construction. 33 Such
decisions result in strict interpretation, confined largely to the four
corners of the decree, and only occasionally stray from these bounds to
consider correspondence between the parties during negotiation. No
notice is taken of the original complaint, or of the economic circum-
stances which led to the decree.
In Hughes v. United States, 3 the Supreme Court strictly applied
contract principles to hold that where the decree was written in the
alternative, and the defendant had satisfied one of the alternative
requirements, it would be unfair to modify the decree by ordering
pursuit of the other alternative without further evidentiary hearings and
findings of fact and law.3 ' The Court reaffirmed its support of the strict
contract approach in United States v. Atlantic Refining Co. 36 The
Court adopted the definition urged by defendants for two ambiguous
words, "share" and "assets," after examining the decree and the
parties' previous activity under the decree.
It is against the background of Hughes and Atlantic Refining that
the Supreme Court decided United States v. Armour & Co. ,37 its most
sweeping affirmation of the strict contractual approach to consent
decrees. In Armour, the Court held that a 1920 consent decree, which
forbade the Armour meatpacking company from acquiring any interest
in a retail food chain, did not prohibit Greyhound, a corporation
already controlling two retail food chains, from purchasing Armour.
Justice Marshall explained that:
Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a com-
promise; in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of
risk, the parties each give up something they might have won
had they proceeded with litigation. Thus, the decree itself
cannot be said to have a purpose; rather the parties have
purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant
decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the
33. The Supreme Court originally rejected the contract analogy in the leading decree
modification case, United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932). In other
interpretation cases, however, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the use of contract
principles. See United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971), and cases cited
therein. See also Handler, supra note 30, at 33-34; Jinkinson, Negotiation of Consent
Decrees, 9 AirrRusT BULL. 673, 675-76 (1964).
34. 342 U.S. 353 (1952).
35. Id. at 356.
36 360 U.S. 19 (1959).
37. 402 U.S. 673 (1971).
1977]
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respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to
achieve. 38
Of the many possible items each party has given up (or gained) by
entering the consent decree, it is clear the defendant has waived the
right guaranteed by the due process clause to litigate the issues origi-
nally raised in the government's complaint. Therefore, the terms by
which defendant gave the waiver "must be respected, and the instru-
ment must be construed as it is written, and not as it might have been
written, had the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal
theories in litigation."
39
The Government's objection to the Armour acquisition was
primarily aimed at Greyhound, a party who had no part in the forma-
tion of the decree.' The Government had the option to bring an
original action against Greyhound instead of attempting to stretch the
existing language of the Armour decree to cover a third party. The
terms of the decree did not purport to bind "successors and assigns"
and contained no indication that the agreement was directed at any
third parties;41 the majority could find no way to bring Greyhound
within the ambit of the original decree.42
The Armour decision has resulted in significant changes in the way
the Antitrust Division phrases its consent decrees,4 3 thus mooting
much of the Court's reasoning. Armour's uncompromised affirmance
of strict contract analysis, however, presently sets the standard by
which most courts interpret consent decrees.
B. The Purpose Approach
An alternative to a strict contract analysis in the interpretation of
consent decrees was found in the "purpose" approach. Under this
approach courts look to the economic situation which led to the
original decree when interpreting and modifying the terms of the
agreement. 44 Some decrees have explicit purpose clauses, 45 on which
38. Id. at 681-82 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 682.
40. Id. at 677.
41. Id. at 680.
42. Justice Douglas, dissenting, insisted that the Court's view was too narrow and
that the decree should be read, as the Government had urged, with a view towards the
purpose for which the parties had sought the original decree. Id. at 686. The majority
clearly recognized the strong policy reasons behind the Government's contention, but
noted that where "unforeseen circumstances now make additional relief desirable to
prevent the evils aimed at by the original complaint," the appropriate enforcement
mechanism is either modification or a separate antitrust action. Id. at 681.
43. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43,236 (1975) (proposed consent decrees).
44. See text accompanying notes 47-52 infra.
45. E.g., United States v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., [1955] Trade Cas.
[Vol. 28:202
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the court can base its analysis. In other instances, a court could
consider the original complaint, the economic conditions of the indus-
try, and-if the decree was filed after 1974 46-the competitive impact
statement, and the comments of interested third parties.
The purpose analysis should not be a subterfuge behind which the
court effects a modification of the agreement on the basis of general
policy arguments. The court is still interpreting a written document.
Ambiguous decree terms are defined by considering the words of the
decree "in light of the issues and purposes for which [the decree] was
sought." 4 7 When the ambiguous term is a broad one, such as "en-
couraging competition," an expanded scope of inquiry can actually
extend the issue to include the intent of the parties. In consent agree-
ments, however, the intent of the parties is not a unitary concept. As
the decree reflects a compromise only tolerably acceptable to the two
parties, the language of the decree is left ambiguous.4 8 Hence in
balancing the parties' conflicting interests, courts most often follow
the Armour approach and rely almost exclusively on the language of
the decree. There is consequently little authority for a purpose
analysis.
In United States v. R.L. Polk and Co. ,I9 however, a district court
considered the economic reality of the marketplace to avoid what
would have been an illogical result under a strict contract approach.
The Antitrust Division brought a contempt action against Polk for
violating a court decree which prohibited the firm from selling city
directories "below cost." The defendant contended that "sales below
cost" meant that "the price at which a copy of the city directory was
sold was below the cost of producing that particular copy." 5 ° The
defendant's cost per copy was extremely low because the company
operated on a cash basis accounting system and did not include the
T 68,173, at 70,830, 70,834 (S.D.N.Y.) (art. VI); United States v. Continental Can Co.,
[1950-51] Trade Cas. 62,680, at 63,976, 63,980-81 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (art. III (1)).
46. See text accompanying notes 80-91 infra.
47. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. United States, 266 U.S. 17, 29 (1924). The full quote is
perhaps the best statement of the Court's ambivalence between contract and purpose
approaches:
[A] decree will not be expanded by implication or intendment beyond the
meaning of its terms when read in the light of the issues and the purpose for
which the suit was brought; and the facts must constitute a plain violation of the
decree so read.
Id. (emphasis added).
48. Cf. United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673,681-82 (1971) (decree reflects
best bargaining power and skill of the parties).
49. [1968] Trade Cas. 72,348, at 84,946 (E.D. Mich. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
438 F.2d 377 (1971).
50. Id. at 84,947.
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expense of future advertising as a cost in producing the directories.
The Government argued that "sale below cost" meant "unreasonably
low prices" with the "intent to destroy competition.'"51
The Polk court could neither allow the meaning of "sale below
cost" to turn on the type of accounting system used, nor could it read
"intent to destroy competition" into the express terms of the decree.
Instead of contriving an interpretation of decree terms, the court
adopted a purpose analysis. It tailored the definition of "sale below
cost" to the special circumstances of the market involved. The market
for city directories is a natural monopoly since the "mere existence of
competition predictably resulted in a loss." 52 The court held that Polk
was permitted to sell some directories below cost in markets controlled
at the time of the decree, since the firm must be permitted to protect
itself.53 However, Polk was prohibited from using extremely low
prices or excessive promotional efforts to eliminate competition in
surrounding communities. Thus, when Polk attempted to expand its
market, it could not charge prices which would ruin the competitor's
business.
The purpose analysis thus permits the introduction of a great deal
more extrinsic evidence than does the strict contract approach. In Polk,
a strict contract approach would have prevented consideration of any
evidence of market conditions at the time the decree was formulated.
The narrow question would merely have been whether "sales below
cost" was to be calculated by cash or accrual basis accounting. This
would not have resolved the issue as clearly as the purpose approach.
There are two serious drawbacks to the purpose approach. First,
courts are generally hesitant to invite a relitigation of the issues in the
original suit. Since the purpose approach permits a broader inquiry into
economic considerations, and the admission of more extrinsic evi-
dence, relitigation is more likely and the original issues are apt to
resurface. Second, the purpose analysis raises due process problems
arising from ambiguities in the terms of the negotiated decree. 54 When
a defendant has not clearly had notice that its conduct violated the
decree terms, courts may be unwilling to mete out punishment. The
tendency to alter or expand the meanings in consent decrees is clearly
stronger under a purpose approach.55 Punishment for questionable
51. Id.
52. Id. at 84,948 (emphasis in original).
53. Id.
54. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
55. It is especially strong when there is evidence of bad faith. See text accompany-
ing notes 177-81 infra.
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violations, however, may infringe upon the defendant's right to be
heard.56 As long as relitigation and due process problems remain, few
courts will be eager to adopt a purpose approach unless they are faced
with a special case like Polk, where a strict interpretation would vitiate
the decree.
C. The Modified Contract Approach
While the courts have generally followed a contractual approach
when faced with the problem of interpreting consent decrees, in sever-
al cases they have attached significance to the purpose, setting, and
effect of the clauses concerned in determining a penalty for noncom-
pliance. 57 This "modified contract" approach is not inconsistent with
the application of contract principles. Its primary concern is still with
the language of the agreement, and it discourages broad ranging
inquiry into the original merits and economic underpinnings of the
decree. However, while the cases make passing reference to the strict
Armour standard, it is clear that this approach is both more liberal in
the variety of extrinsic evidence that is admissible, and more sensitive
to the government's purpose in entering a compromise settlement.
Thus far, the modified contract approach has only been used when
violation of the decree was so clear that the only issue before the court
was the propriety of daily fines. The analytical and interpretive prob-
lems are the same when either question is before the court; in each
instance the court is analyzing the challenged conduct in light of the
decree terms. However, there are indications that the modified contract
analysis may supplant Armour's strict contract approach. 58
The first case to present the issue of interpretation as it applies to
appropriate sanctions for noncompliance was United States v. Beatrice
Foods Co. 59 In 1956, Beatrice entered into a consent order which
forbade it from "acquiring, directly or indirectly, through subsidiaries
or otherwise" any "interest in" a dairy. 6° In May 1967, the decree
was formally modified to force Beatrice to divest itself of five newly
acquired dairies and the nonacquisition clause was reaffirmed. Then,
in 1968, Beatrice purchased some distributorships from Maple Island
Dairies.
56. 342 U.S. 353 (1952).
57. E.g., United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 493 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 961 (1975).
58. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223 (1975) (dissenting
opinion).
59. 493 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 961 (1975).
60. Id. at 1262 n.2. There is an identical provision in at least 54 other FTC orders.
United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 250 n.7 (1975) (dissenting
opinion).
1977]
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The FTC brought suit under section 5(l) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act and section 11(l) of the Clayton Act. Taking a
modified contract or "effect" approach, the district court refused to
permit evidence of the negotiations or the "purpose" of the decree; it
looked instead to the effect of the acquisition, and inquired whether the
language of the decree supported an interpretation that forbade the
conduct.6 Since the acquisition clearly violated the decree and in-
creased a monopolistic tendency, the court found that daily fines were
appropriate.6 2 The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 63 Also rejecting a "pur-
pose" approach, the court still went beyond strict contract analysis,
holding that the word "acquire" must be construed as meaning "ac-
quire and hold," since any other construction would render the nonac-
quisition orders meaningless.
64
The Supreme Court expressly approved Beatrice's modified con-
tract approach in United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co. 65
Continental was subject to a 1962 consent decree which forbade it
from "acquiring" any part of any concern engaged in the production
of bread. Before the decree's ten year term expired, Continental
acquired three bakeries. Both the district court66 and the Tenth Circuit 67
ruled in favor of Continental, holding that since the company could
"acquire" only once there was no continuing violation.
Overruling the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court distinguished
Hughes, Atlantic Refining, and Armour. Justice Brennan noted that in
the earlier cases no violation was found, while the violation in the
instant case was clear. 68 The only issue facing the Court was discern-
ing congressional intent in fashioning the "continuing violation" pro-
vision of the Act. The violations reached were found to be those in
which "the detrimental effect to the public and the advantage to the
violator continue and increase over a period of time, and the violator
could eliminate the effects of the violation . . . after it had begun." 69
Continental's acquisition was within this rule: it eliminated com-
petitors and naturally increased Continental's share of the market.
After reemphasizing that the issue in Continental Baking was the
61. United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 344 F. Supp. 104, 113 (D. Minn. 1972).
62. United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 351 F. Supp. 969, 971 (D. Minn. 1972).
63. 493 F.2d 1259 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 961 (1975).
64. Id. at 1269-70.
65. 420 U.S. 223 (1975).
66. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., [1972] Trade Cas. 73,993, at
92,127 (D. Colo. 1971).
67. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 485 F.2d 16 (1973).
68. 420 U.S. at 234-37.
69. Id. at 231.
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appropriate penalty, and not the fact of violation, the Court doubled
back to state that it did not need to decide whether the acquisition
would support the imposition of daily penalties.
70
The majority examined the decree itself to find the justification for
daily penalties. In this case, the consent order between the parties was
part of a larger agreement which provided explicitly that the complaint
could be used in construing the terms of the order. 71 Read in the
context of the negotiations, the use of the word "acquiring" in the
complaint was found to be an antitrust term of art which included the
retention of assets obtained, thereby justifying daily penalties. 72
Despite the careful contractual analysis of the decree text by the
Continental Baking majority, four justices, lead by Mr. Justice
Stewart, dissented. Quoting Armour,73 Justice Stewart argued that the
majority had inexplicably and without authority broadened the per-
missible inquiry into a wide-ranging search for purpose. 74 Under the
Armour rule
parties to any consent decree could have confidence that
its explicit terms alone would control the judicial construction
... . Now, otherwise unambiguous terms of a consent de-
cree may be construed in light of such considerations as the
antecedent complaint, the "meaning" of antitrust decisions,
and the policies said to underlie the statutory provision for
daily penalties. 75
Justice Stewart's criticism is not entirely fair. The decree expressly
provided for construction in accordance with the allegations of the
complaint. The broader scope of evidence examined by the majority in
Continental Baking can be justified by the differences in language
from the decree involved in Armour.
The majority noted, in dicta, that consent decrees do not define
penalties, but proscribe conduct. 76 Thus, when another decree is be-
fore the court, and the language will not support the imposition of a
penalty the court finds appropriate, the court may claim for itself the
power to punish violations. It is a traditional concern of the judicial
system that violators not be able simply to incur legal penalties as a
"cost of doing business." In discussing the legislative history of the
FTC penalty provision, the Court notes congressional concern with
70. Id. at 238.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 240-43.
73. Id. at 244. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
74. 420 U.S. at 248.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 233-38.
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this problem.77 Therefore, in determining the appropriate penalty,
courts may emphasize the judicial order rather than the contractual
attributes of a consent decree.
D. The Impact of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974
The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 197478 provides ad-
ditional support for a purpose or modified contractual approach in
the interpretation of consent decrees. Dissatisfied with certain practices,
which resulted in extremely compromised consent decrees, 79 Congress
mandated a more active role for judges in the formation of the decrees.
The 1974 Act is designed to safeguard the public's interest in consent
decree negotiations by requiring the trial court to examine all relevant
comments before entering the decree.
Under the new procedures, the Justice Department must file a
"competitive impact statement" reciting:
(1) the nature and purpose of the proceeding;
(2) a description of the practices or events giving rise to the
alleged violation of the antitrust laws;
(3) an explanation of the proposal for a consent judgment,
including an explanation of any unusual circumstances
giving rise to such proposal or any provision contained
therein, relief to be obtained thereby, and the anticipated
effects on competition of such relief;
(4) the remedies available to potential private plaintiffs
damaged by the alleged violation in the event that such
proposal for the consent judgment is entered in such
proceeding;
(5) a description of the procedures available for modifica-
tion of such proposal; and
(6) a description and evaluation of alternatives to such pro-
posal actually considered by the United States.8"
77. Id. at 231.
78. Act of Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 2, 88 Stat. 1706 (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 16 (1970)).
79. The revision of consent decree procedures was primarily the result of the 1971
settlement of the ITT litigation. United States v. ITT (Grinnell Corp.), [1971] Trade Cas.
73,665 (D. Conn.); United States v. ITT (Hartford Fire Ins. Co.), [1971] Trade Cas.
73,666 (D. Conn.). Some charged that contributions by ITT to the Republican Party
influenced the settlement. Prompted by the ITT cases, Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D.-
N.J.) scheduled hearings aimed at removing the veil of secrecy surrounding consent
decree negotiations. He suggested that public impact statements be aired in a public
forum. ANTITRUST & TRADE REO. REP. (BNA) No. 630, at A-15 (1973).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970), as amended by Act of Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-528, § 2, 88 Stat. 1706.
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The competitive impact statement must be published in the Federal
Register sixty days prior to the entry of the decree, and the proposed
decree must be published in newspapers of general circulation for two
weeks, beginning sixty days prior to theentry of the decree."1 The
Justice Department is required to consider any written statement relat-
ing to the proposed decree.8 2 Then, on the basis of the information
received, the trial court must determine that the decree is in the
"public interest" before it enters the consent judgment. 83
Critics of the Act assert that these procedures will hamper the
government in its attempt to obtain broader relief than it would have
been able to achieve through litigation. 4 Professor Handler points out:
Intervenors, amici curiae, experts, prospective treble damage
suitors, self-appointed guardians of the public interest and
government agencies will be free to criticize the decree and to
ask that it be rejected or that additional relief be provided
... . What is more, if the court's search for the "public
interest" is to be more than pro forma, the process will
probably require what amounts to the very trial on the merits
that a consent decree is designed to obviate. 5
Notwithstanding such criticism, the Act should make it easier to
enforce consent decrees. The competitive impact statement and other
documents used in the "public interest" determination will be avail-
able to help clarify terms of the decree. Secondly, the information
required by the Act may resolve interpretive issues before the decree is
formalized.
Judicial reaction to the provisions of the Act has been generally
hostile. 86 Courts have not considered the wisdom of the decree in light
of the total economic setting, but have criticized only concrete short-
comings in compliance with the decree. 87 As one court noted:
81. Id. § 16(b), (c).
82. Id. § 16(d).
83. Id. § 16(e).
84. Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv.
211, 243 (1975).
85. Id. at 241-42.
86. On the other hand, even before passage of the Act, some courts carefully
scrutinized the provisions of decrees before entering a consent judgment. Esco Corp. v.
United States, 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Carter Prod., Inc., 211 F.
Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). At least one court stated that it would disapprove the decree
if it was unenforceable or adversely affected the interests of third parties. United States
v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (D.C. Cal. 1969), appeal dismissed, 397
U.S. 248 (1970). In several cases where the trial court solicited comments of interested
parties, inadequacies in the decrees were discovered and remedied. E.g., United States
v. Carter Prod., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
87. United States v. Gillette, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 746, at D-1
(D. Mass. 1975) (inadequate divestiture and not agreeing to refrain from entering dry
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It is not the court's duty to determine whether this is the best
possible settlement that could have been obtained if, say, the
government had bargained a little harder. The court is not
settling the case. It is determining whether the settlement
achieved is within the reaches of the public interest. Basi-
cally, I must look at the overall picture not hypercritically,
nor with a microscope, but with an artist's reducing glass.
88
Courts will also decide whether a decree is in the public interest by
determining whether the decree provides substantially the same relief
the government could have obtained had it won the case at trial.89
Although it is still too early to assess the full impact of the Act on
the interpretation of consent decrees, the Supreme Court has demon-
strated its willingness to utilize documents surrounding the negotiation
and entry of the decree to clarify ambiguous terms in order to deter-
mine a violation and assess appropriate penalties. 90 The Court was not
dealing with the 1974 Act, and made no reference to its provisions;
however, the Court's use of extrinsic evidence is an implicit affirm-
ance of the Act's methodology, and may portend future use of the
modified contract approach to help interpret consent decrees.
III. ENFORCEMENT AND SANCTIONS
If a defendant fails to comply with the terms of a consent decree,
the government may seek one or more of four distinct sanctions. First,
either the Antitrust Division or the FTC can request the court to modify
the decree. 91 Although modification is not, strictly speaking, an en-
forcement measure, as there is no penalty imposed on the defendant,
the defendant must comply with the terms of the new decree which
have been altered to meet new circumstances.
Second, criminal contempt is available to the Antitrust Division if
a firm persistently and flagrantly violates the terms of a decree. The
consent decree is no different from a litigated decree in this respect: the
judge punishes the disobedience in order to vindicate the court's
authority. 92
shaving products fiefd); United States v. Associated Milk Producers, 394 F. Supp. 29
(W.D. Mo. 1975) (political pressure).
88. United States v. Gillette, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 746, at D-1
(D. Mass. 1975).
89. Id.; United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal.
1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
90. United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 237-40 (1975).
91. See Note, Requests by the Government for Modification of Consent Decrees, 75
YALE L.J. 657 (1966).
92. See United States v. Schine, 125 F. Supp. 734 (W.D.N.Y. 1954). Any court of the
United States has "power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion such
contempt of its authority .. .as . . .[d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ,
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Civil contempt, a third approach, is a judicial sanction to force
either "compliance with an order of the court or to compensate for
losses or damages sustained by reason of noncompliance." 93 In a civil
contempt action, the court imposes a daily fine, or orders incarcera-
tion, until the defendant purges himself of contempt by complying
with the court order. 94
In theory the primary purpose of civil contempt is to preserve the
benefit of the decree to third parties by securing immediate com-
pliance. 95 Criminal contempt punishes past conduct which disregarded
the authority of the court. The theoretical distinction in purpose be-
tween civil and criminal contempt is not as important as the difference
in the identity of the parties seeking the order and the nature of the
relief sought.
While particular acts do not always readily lend them-
selves to classification as civil or criminal contempts, a con-
tempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly re-
medial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is
not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public. 96
Only the FTC may seek the fourth remedy by proceeding under
section 11 (1) of the Clayton Act 97 and/or section 5(l) of the FTC Act, 98
which authorize daily civil penalties of up to $10,000. Although
proving violation of the consent decree raises issues similar to those of
contempt, the action is a "suit to enforce" the consent order.
A. Modification
Once a consent decree has been in operation for a few years, either
party to the decree may seek to change some of its terms. If the
process, order, rule, decree, or command." 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) (emphasis added). Cf.
United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168 (7th Cir.
1947) (no criminal contempt where court order violated unintentionally).
93. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1948). See also Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 68 (1948); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947);
Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947).
94. See Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 448 (1911). See also
notes 147-48 infra and accompanying text.
95. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 67-68 (1948).
96. McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 64 (1939). Even when no third party has
a clear proprietary interest, courts have permitted the government to seek civil contempt
for the benefit of the public. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); United States
v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 95 F. Supp. 1019 (D.D.C. 1951).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 21(l) (1970).
98. Id. § 45(l) (Supp. V, 1975). The maximum civil penalty was raised from $5,000 to
$10,000 in 1973. While 15 U.S.C. § 21(l) still limits penalties to "not more than $5,000 for
each violation," it has been held that the two sections must be read in pari materia. Thus
the maximum penalty under both statutes is $10,000. United States v. Papercraft Corp.,
393 F. Supp. 415, 417-18 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
1977l
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
defendant feels that the decree restrictions are too burdensome and
produce unanticipated results, or if the government decides that the
terms are not strict enough, a motion for modification may be filed in
the district court. Since modification is essentially antagonistic to the
contractual aspect of the consent decree, courts are generally reluctant
to grant such a modification and have placed a heavy burden on the
moving party who wishes to obtain a change in the status quo. 99 The
standard, however, is not settled and courts seem divided as to the
proper model to utilize in modification. The majority of courts adhere
to a contract model,' ° but there is authority to the effect that, when the
party seeking modification is the government, a less burdensome
standard should be applied.' 0'
The landmark Supreme Court decision, United States v. Swift &
Co. ,102 set the standard for judicial modification of antitrust consent
decrees. In Swift the defendant firm argued that certain restrictions in a
twelve year old consent decree were "useless and oppressive.' 
0 3
Justice Cardozo writing for the majority and denying the motion
explained:
The inquiry for us is whether the changes are so important
that dangers, once substantial, have become attenuated to a
shadow. No doubt the defendants will be better off if the
injunction is relaxed, but they are not suffering hardship so
extreme and unexpected as to justify us in saying that they
are the victims of oppression. Nothing less than a clear show-
ing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen condi-
tions should lead us to change what was decreed after years
of litigation with the consent of all concerned. 1" 4
Justice Cardozo's test, as it has been subsequently interpreted, is
two-pronged. First, the defendant must show that the conditions lead-
ing to the decree have changed so drastically that the need for the
99. See notes 102-07 infra and accompanying text.
100. E.g., United States v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 178 F. Supp. 325 (N.D.
Ohio 1959).
101. See Note, supra note 91, at 662-64.
102. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
103. Id. at 113.
104. Id. at 119.
Swift attempted to modify the decree in 1960 on the basis of Rule 60(b)(5) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a court to relieve a party from a final
judgment if it "is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective applica-
tion." This rule, according to the district court, merely enacted existing substantive law
and did not change the Swift standard. United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885,
905 (N.D. II. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 367 U.S. 909 (1961).
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decree no longer exists. 105 Second, the defendant must show an unjus-
tifiable present hardship "evoked by new and unforeseen condi-
tions." ' 10 6 Even when the defendant proves that there is a hardship,
modification will be denied if the government can establish that the
restriction is imposed in the public interest. ' 0 7
The Swift test, or one patterned on it, is used at both the federal
and state level for modifying decrees of continuing effect. 08 While
many commentators and cases have suggested that the Swift rule is to
be applied just as strictly to the government, as to private parties, 10 9
government motions for modification appear to be tested on a separate
and relaxed standard.110
Chrysler Corp. v. United States"11 was the first indication by the
Supreme Court that a different standard would be used to evaluate
government modification requests. Chrysler arose from an indictment
of the three major automobile manufacturers, General Motors, Ford,
and Chrysler, for discriminatory practices in the financing of auto-
mobile purchases. In 1938, Ford and Chrysler consented to decrees
which required them to separate from their affiliate loan companies. 
112
105. The change can be one of fact or law. Systems Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S.
642, 647-48 (1961).
106. 286 U.S. at 119.
107. 189 F. Supp. at 912.
108. In state courts the moving party must demonstrate that a change in circum-
stances has made the decree unduly oppressive. See, e.g., Ozark Bi-Products, Inc. v.
Bohannon, 224 Ark. 17, 21, 271 S.W.2d 354, 357 (1954); Sontag Chain Stores Co. v.
Superior Ct., 18 Cal. 2d 92, 95, 113 P.2d 689, 690 (1941); Jackson Grain Co. v. Lee, 150
Fla. 232, 237-38, 7 So. 2d 143, 146 (1942); Emergency Hosp. of Easton v. Stevens, 146
Md. 159, 166, 126 A. 101, 104 (1924); Weaver v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co., 30
Minn. 477, 479, 16 N.W. 269, 269-70 (1883); Board of County Comm'rs v. Scott, 178
Neb. 53, 54-55, 131 N.W.2d 711, 712 (1964); Johnson & Johnson v. Weissbard, 11 N.J.
552, 555-56, 95 A.2d 403, 405 (1953); People v. Scanlon, 11 N.Y.2d 459,462, 184 N.E.2d
302, 303, 230 N.Y.S.2d 708, 709-10 (1962); 46 S. 52nd St. Corp. v. Manlin, 404 Pa. 159,
160, 172 A.2d 154, 155 (1961); Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 497, 148 A. 699, 702 (1930);
Uvalde Paving Co. v. Kennedy, 22 S.W.2d 1091, 1092 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
In federal court, Swift has been cited well over one hundred times. See United States
v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. II. 1960).
109. M. Goldberg, The Consent Decree: Its Formulation and Use 6 (Occasional Paper
No. 8, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Michigan State Univ.)(1962), at 2;
Dabney, Antitrust Consent Decrees: How Protective An Umbrella?, 68 YALE L.J. 1391,
1392-93 (1959); Jinkinson, Negotiation of Consent Decrees, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 673, 682
(1964); Kramer, Modification of Consent Decrees: A Proposal to the Antitrust Division,
56 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1054-62 (1958). See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46
F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942).
110. Duncan, Post-Litigation Resulting From Alleged Non-Compliance With Govern-
ment Antitrust Consent Decrees, 8 W. RES. L. REV. 45, 48-49 (1956); Phillips, The
Consent Decree in Antitrust Enforcement, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 39,45 (1961); Note,
supra note 91, at 660-64.
111. 316 U.S. 556 (1942).
112. Id. at 557.
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The decrees were to lapse in 1941 if the Government did not obtain
either a decision against, or settlement with, General Motors. In 1941,
Ford and Chrysler agreed to a one year extension when the Govern-
ment was unable to conclude the suit against General Motors." 3 When
the Government requested a second extension in 1942, Chrysler op-
posed the modification. The lower court granted the modification
4
and the Supreme Court affirmed. 1 5 The Court stated: "We think that
the test to be applied in answering this question is whether the change
served to effectuate or to thwart the basic purpose of the original
consent decree."" 16 While the Court cited Swift, there was no showing
of change sufficient to meet that burdensome test. What is even more
surprising, when Ford sought to be relieved of the provisions in 1948,
the Court held that the Government had not shown "good cause" to
continue the restrictions." 7
The opinions that followed Ford and Chrysler have not reconciled
the standard employed in the automobile finance cases with the Swift
standard. In fact, the Court created another test, by denying a govern-
ment request and stating that modification is appropriate "where
necessary to preserve competition and to prevent monopoly."" 8
The differences between various standards result from the dual
nature of the consent decree. The strict contract view of consent
decrees would emphasize finality, and would therefore favor the Swift
standard. On the other hand, if the consent decree is perceived as a
continuing judicial order, designed to safeguard the public interest in
antitrust enforcement, then the government should be able to seek
modification to effectuate the "purpose" of the decree. The mixed
judicial response is essentially a reflection of the hybrid decree, conse-
quently there are reasons not to overemphasize either aspect.
Commentators have pointed out, with reference to the strict con-
tractual theory of Swift, that the efficacy and efficiency of consent
decrees as devices to resolve antitrust disputes depends upon the
finality of settlements. 19 If the terms of a decree are subject to change,
the parties can place little reliance on it, and the entire procedure is
113. Id. at 560.
114. Id. at 562.
115. Id. at 564.
116. Id. at 562.
117. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 322 (1948). Some commentators
suggest that the Ford case signalled a return to the Swift standard. See Comment, 55
MICH. L. REV. 92, 97 (1956); Comment, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Enforcement-
Analysis and Criticism, 32 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 367, 371-72 (1960).
118. Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353, 357 (1952).
119. Kramer, supra note 109, at 1058; Comment, 55 MICH. L. REV. 92, 95-96 (1956).
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wasted. Thus, the commentators argue, courts should require the
government to meet the Swift standard, and should be reluctant to alter
the product of the negotiation process. 2 0
The judicial order, or "purpose," approach seems to have arisen
as a result of several deficiencies in the strict contract theory. 121 First,
the court's role of furthering the public interest in fair competition was
more formal than real under the strict contract approach. 122 An in-
terpretation restricted to the written document itself might result in
binding the public to the terms of a decree which has an anticompeti-
tive effect. Second, there was concern that the consent decree could
easily be abused to shelter and legitimize anticompetitive conduct. 23
Therefore, if a decree is not securing compliance with the law, courts
determined that the terms should be modified on a showing that this
major justification for the decree was not being fulfilled.124
In conclusion, there is merit to arguments for both the contract and
purpose analysis and it is not surprising to find that courts have applied
both the Swift test and the purpose test. 125
B. Criminal Contempt
The elements of a criminal contempt action are that the defendant:
(1) committed acts which disobeyed or resisted the lawful decree of the
court; (2) had knowledge or notice that the actions were prohibited by
the order; and (3) wilfully participated in such disobedience or resist-
ance.126 The first element is the actus reus and presents little difficulty;
the action or threatened action which prompted the government chal-
lenge is usually clear. Whether the action is a violation of the decree,
and whether the second and third elements are present, raise more
difficult problems.
Both the determination of a violation and the second element,
notice or knowledge, depend upon the court's interpretation of the
120. See Peterson, Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Anti-trust Enforcement, 18 U.
KAN. CiTY L. REV. 34, 40 (1950).
121. Note, supra note 91, at 665.
122. See Jinkinson, supra note 109, at 676.
123. See Dabney, supra note 109, at 1391.
124. This argument is suggested by the very elements of the standard for modification
as enunciated in cases following Swift. The first prong of this test relies upon a drastic
change in the conditions which originally led to the decree. At the same time, any judicial
examination of such conditions would be inimicable to a strict contract approach.
Nevertheless, it is obviously important to provide procedures to adapt decrees to
changing conditions.
125. See notes 99-118 supra and accompanying text.
126. United States v. Schine, 125 F. Supp. 734, 737 (W.D.N.Y. 1954).
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terms of the decree. If it is unclear whether the defendant has violated
the decree, it is unlikely that the firm and its officers would have been
aware that the activity was improper, and criminal contempt is prob-
ably inappropriate. Where the violation is clear, however, notice may
be assumed. Hence, the approach taken in interpretation of the decree
may be decisive. If the court takes a strict contract approach, the
government will have to prove that the conduct in question violates
specific decree prohibitions. Violations under this standard will be
difficult to prove. Under a purpose or a modified contract analysis, a
court would determine whether the particular action was the type of
activity that the decree was intended to cover when the decree was
written. Violation and notice should be easier to prove. The harshness
of criminal contempt sanctions, on the other hand, could easily make
courts utilizing a purpose approach reluctant to find notice. 127 When
courts interpret the decree broadly to find a violation, they are more
likely to separate the issues of violation and notice. Thus under either
the contract or the purpose approach, criminal contempt has been
difficult to prove.
An example of how a court's view of the decree will play a factor
in the outcome of the criminal contempt action is United States v.
American Can Co. 128 The defendant, a lessor of canning equipment,
was prohibited by a final judgment in a prior antitrust case from
"conditioning the availability of. . . containers . . . upon the pur-
chase or lease of container closing machines . " 129 Several years
later Davis sued the defendant for damages suffered because of defec-
tive cans supplied by American. While the damage claim was pending,
Davis's equipment lease expired. American sought renewal of the
lease and an "open order acknowledgment contract," which would
require Davis to accept cans without the customary warranty until
American could approve the methods and processes used by Davis.
Davis, however, feared that renewing the lease with the open order
acknowledgment would constitute a waiver of its pending warranty
claim, and so refused to renew. When American pressured Davis to
renew, the Government brought a criminal contempt action against
American for violating the terms of the judgment.
The Government argued that American was attempting to prejudice
Davis' claim, and had violated the terms of the decree by threatening
to break off sales during the peak canning season. American argued
that the terms did not discriminate against Davis since the same
127. See text accompanying notes 128-33 infra.
128. 126 F. Supp. 811 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
129. Id. at 811 n.l.
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conditions were offered to, and accepted by, other lessees. 130 The
court reasoned that:
[T]he dispute between the government and American narrows
itself to this question: Did American, by imposing as condi-
tions for the sale of containers to Davis, the signing of a lease
for can closing equipment and an open order acknowl-
edgement contract, violate the decree of this Court? In them-
selves, the conditions American actually presented to Davis
were legitimate and proper under the terms of the judgment of
the Court.'
The court in American Can was dealing with a final judgment, not a
consent decree. The interpretation problems regarding the purposes of
a negotiated decree never arose. Nevertheless, the court strictly con-
strued the terms of the earlier judgment to find no violation and no
notice.
Another example of a court's reluctance even to consider the
charge of criminal contempt unless the defendant had notice that its
actions constituted contumacious conduct, is United States v. Kelsey-
Hayes Co. 132 A 1955 consent decree prohibited the defendant manu-
facturers from entering into any collusive price or marketing agree-
ments with any distributor. The manufacturer subsequently began to
"suggest" retail prices and "discuss" market problems with dis-
tributors in a joint trade association. The Government conceded that
the company's actions, taken by themselves, were not prohibited, but
argued that the totality of the conduct violated the decree. The court
granted a motion to dismiss with the following explanation:
While recognizing the importance of enforcing antitrust de-
crees, it offends my judicial sense of common everyday fair-
ness to have respondents charged with criminal contempt on
a Consent Decree outstanding for over fourteen years, with-
out notice or even an intimation to them by the government of
a claimed violation or a good faith attempt to resolve any
differences there may be, .... 133
The Government's case never got beyond the actual knowledge or
notice requirement because it was premised on a purpose analysis of
the consent decree, which the court refused to follow.
The element of wilfulness is the most difficult and elusive part of
the government's case for criminal contempt. Even when the violation
130. Id. at 812-13. American apparently had sufficient leverage to extract any terms
it wanted. The fact that other lessees and purchasers agreed to the conditions would
therefore seem irrelevant.
131. 126 F. Supp. at 814.
132. [1971] Trade Cas. 173,741, at 91,120 (E.D. Mich.), appeal dismissed, 476 F.2d
265 (6th Cir. 1973).
133. Id. at 91,126 (emphasis in original).
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is clear, conviction is rare because the government must prove defend-
ant's specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 134 The factual pattern
in any antitrust action is complex, which further complicates problems
of proof. Moreover, the court seldom separates its analysis of the two
crucial issues-interpretation of the decree and evidence of wilful
disobedience. 135 For example, in United States v. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co. ,136 the defendant Kroger admitted that its employees had
violated a court decree, but denied that the violation was intentional.
Kroger detected the violation and had made a good faith effort to
correct its action. The Government argued that specific intent should
be imputed. The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed a judgment of
criminal contempt on the ground that the Government failed to prove
"specific wrongful intent."' 13' Thus, it seems courts are reluctant to
find a defendant guilty of criminal contempt unless the violation is
"flagrant, intentional, deliberate or reckless," a difficult standard to
meet. 138
In United States v. Schine'39 the Government successfully proved
wilful disobedience by demonstrating a conspiracy to violate spe-
cific decree prohibitions. In 1949, the Government settled a monopoli-
zation suit against the Schine Chain Theatres, and the court approved a
consent decree which called for divestiture of certain theaters. The
order also prohibited Schine from acquiring new theaters, without
court approval, and prohibited Schine from entering into any conspir-
acy or combination to monopolize the theater industry. 4o The corpora-
tion, and its owners, thereafter purchased and booked other movie
theaters through an affiliated corporation and an illegal pooling ar-
rangement with a subsidiary. The Government instituted criminal
134. See In re Floersheim, 316 F.2d 423, 428 (9th Cir. 1963) (defendant found not
guilty of contempt because intentional, flagrant, deliberate, or reckless conduct was not
proven).
135. E.g., United States v. Schine, 125 F. Supp. at 737.
136. 163 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1947).
137. Id. at 173-74.
138. 316 F.2d at 428. The court in United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., [1971] Trade
Cas. 73,741, at 91,120 (E.D. Mich.) put the standard in perhaps even stricter terms:
The government here concedes that respondents did not participate in a
clandestine, secret, collusive or predatory conduct, "it is hard to characterize
them [their conduct] as vicious or overt" and there is no claim of a hard-core
sinister price-fixing agreement, as obtained in the General Electric cases. There
is no claim of a deliberate, "flagrant" violation.
Id. at 91,125 (quoting the Government's statement during oral argument of the case on
October 5, 1971, Record at 80, 96).
139. 125 F. Supp. 734 (W.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 260 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 934 (1959).
140. 125 F. Supp. at 735.
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contempt proceedings against Schine and its owners, arguing that the
defendants disobeyed the consent decree by using an illegal pooling
arrangement to buy and book theaters, by arranging discriminatory
pricing conditions, and by acting in concert with the subsidiary to
violate the consent decree. 141
The court held the defendants in contempt for violating and con-
spiring to violate the decree.142 The court was convinced that the
individuals had devised the pooling arrangement to avoid the prohibi-
tions of the decree, making the violation both flagrant and wilful.
Unfortunately for the defendants, the misconduct was itself a violation
of the antitrust laws and could not be justified as a normal business
practice. All three elements of criminal contempt being present, the
court fined both the corporation and its officers for wilfully resisting a
lawful judicial order. 143
The Schine case is the exception rather than the rule. The fact that
the Antitrust Division had to show a conspiracy to commit what would
have been an independent antitrust offense in order to prove wilful-
ness, demonstrates how difficult it is to meet the standard. Until courts
are willing to create a presumption of wilfulness, or decrease the
importance of specific intent, criminal contempt will remain an under-
used enforcement tool.
C. Civil Contempt
A civil contempt action offers the government two advantages over
a criminal contempt proceeding. First, the government does not have
to prove the defendant's wilfulness or specific intent to disobey the
decree terms. Since the purpose of a civil contempt action is to
effectuate the decree, the only issue is whether the defendant's conduct
conforms to the decree terms. Secondly, the government's burden of
proof is less onerous. In civil contempt, the proof need only be clear
and convincing rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.144
The nature of a civil contempt proceeding has provided two other
enforcement benefits. Because of the harshness and stigma of a crimi-
nal conviction, courts have been reluctant to find violations when a
criminal sanction is sought. With civil contempt, the harshness of the
141. 260 F.2d at 555.
142. Id. at 556.
143. Id. at 555.
144. This difference may be more theoretical than real, however, since the courts
have required the evidence to be highly convincing. One court has held that the defend-
ant was not in civil contempt "where there is a reasonable ground to doubt the wrongful-
ness of the conduct." Electro-Bleaching Gas Co. v. Paradon Eng'r Co., 15 F.2d 854, 855
(E.D.N.Y. 1926).
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penalty is considerably diminished since the contemnor "carries the
keys to the jail in his back pocket; ' 1 45 if the defendant complies, the
fine is lifted or the imprisonment ends. Courts, therefore, have been
more willing to use their broad discretionary power to fashion appro-
priate relief. 146
Moreover, civil contempt is a better device to bring relief to third
parties directly affected by noncompliance. While the courts and the
Antitrust Division have staunchly refused to permit third parties to
enforce consent decrees,147 a civil contempt action may compensate
interested parties who sustain losses as a result of the noncom-
pliance. 148 Thus, a court can not only redress the injury to competition,
and reverse the anticompetitive effect of the misconduct, but may also
restore third parties to the position they would have occupied had the
defendant adhered to the decree terms.
To prove civil contempt, the government must show conduct
which violates the decree, and language which expressly prohibits the
action and puts the defendant on notice that his action violates the
decree terms. If the decree does not prohibit the conduct, the govern-
ment will fare no better in civil contempt proceedings than it fares in
seeking criminal contempt. Thus, in several cases the vague wording
of the decrees has led to an early dismissal of the action.
In United States v. Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc. (ACB), 149 the
defendant was charged with violating a 1933 consent decree which
prohibited monopolization of credit information sales, and which pre-
vented the association from expelling members for obtaining credit
information from other organizations. ACB rules required members to
use "coupons" when transacting business among themselves. A com-
petitor solicited ACB members, and ACB responded by reminding its
members that if they did not use "coupons" in intra-association
145. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585,590 (1947) (citing In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448,461
(8th Cir. 1902)).
146. The courts must weigh the "character and magnitude of the harm threatened
. ..and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction .... " United States v.
UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947). See also McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S.
187, 191-95 (1949).
147. See note 2 supra.
148. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70 (Ist Cir. 1946). Where compensation for
interested parties is intended, a fine is imposed, payable to the complainant. Such fine
must of course be based upon evidence of the complainant's actual loss, and his right, as
a civil litigant, to the compensatory fine is dependent upon the outcome of the dispute.
United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. at 304. Cf. Michaelson v. United States, ex rel.
Chicago, St. P., Minn., & Omaha Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924) (criminal contempt fine
may be paid to injured third parties, but this does not change the essential nature of the
action).
149. 345 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
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transactions, membership could be terminated. The Antitrust Division
sought civil contempt to have the coupon rules declared a violation of
the decree.
150
The court held that ACB had not violated the decree terms and that
nothing in the settlement prevented the defendant from imposing its
own rules on its members.' 51 The court found that the decree was
directed against conduct which prevented members from transacting
business with non-member credit bureaus. It reasoned that the coupon
rules promoted uniformity and reliability in credit information.
52
More importantly, since the coupon rules had existed in 1933, and the
Government had not sought to expressly prohibit them at that time, the
defendant was not barred from enforcing its rules, which were a
reasonable restriction on the sale of credit. 153 The court held that the
coupon rule applied only to transactions between members, and thus
did not "prohibit members from using other organizations as sources
of credit information.'
54
The court in Associated did not reach this conclusion by a strictly
contractual approach; rather it analyzed the background of the decree
terms, the function of coupon rules and the probable effect on com-
petitors.155 A contractual approach would have settled the case if the
words of the decree did not expressly prohibit the imposition of coupon
rules on members. Even under the modified contract approach taken in
Associated, however, the language of the decree did not put the
defendants on notice that its conduct was a violation of the agreement.
In United States v. Martin Linen and Supply Co. ,156 the defendant
almost succeeded in obtaining the application of criminal contempt
standards in a civil contempt hearing. The Martin Linen consent
decree declared:
Each corporate defendant is enjoined and restrained from,
directly or indirectly:
(A) threatening, coercing, inducing or attempting to induce:
(1) Any linen rental supplier to refrain while in busi-
ness, from furnishing linen supplies to any customer
157
150. Id. at 944.
151. Id. at 946.
152. Id. at 946-47.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 946.
155. Id. at 945-47.
156. 485 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
157. Id. at 1145.
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Subsequently, Martin Linen allegedly attempted to recoup its losses by
seeking reciprocal trade agreements from other linen suppliers not to
compete for Martin Linen's distributorships. The defendant allegedly
strengthened its negotiating position with threats of recoupment, price
wars, and other retaliatory tactics. 158 The district court held that under
the language of the consent decree Martin Linen could make general
trade threats to persuade competitors to refrain from soliciting Martin
Linen's distributors.' 59 The court took a strict contract approach,
interpreting the language of the decree to mean that the mere threat of
retaliation, without the effect of actually inhibiting competitors, did
not violate the decree terms. 160 Such a high standard-an actual show-
ing of harm to competition as a result of the violation of the consent
decree-had heretofore never been an element of contempt.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed. It found that the only issue
was whether the Government could show that the threats were "aimed
at a competitor with the intent to have that competitor refrain from
competing with Martin."' 16 1 The court went on to say:
The activities of recoupment and retaliation are not per se
violations of Sec. V(A)(1) [of the consent decree]. They are
violations, however, if their announced purpose is to cause
Martin's competitors to refrain from competing, since the
Section prohibits activities which "directly or indirectly" at-
tempt "to induce" competitors "to refrain" from doing busi-
ness. 16
2
Even as it corrects the trial court, however, the circuit court mistakes
the purpose of civil contempt and virtually imposes a standard of
"wilfulness." The Government must prove an "announced purpose"
where, under any rational interpretation of the language, the defendant
is proscribed from making retaliatory threats. Perhaps the court did not
need to state the requirement more loosely, since Martin Linen had
allegedly aimed its threats at competitors, but there is no justification
in a civil contempt proceeding for a court to require that the defendant
specifically intend to violate the terms of the decree. 163
158. The Antitrust Division originally sought both criminal and civil contempt. The
dropping of the criminal charge led Martin Linen to complain that the civil contempt
action had placed them in "double jeopardy." The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument.
"The mere arraignment and pleading to an indictment or the conduct of a preliminary
examination does not place the defendant in jeopardy." Id. at 1147. Only when the
criminal trial begins do the fifth amendment policies come into play. Id.
159. Id. at 1145-46.
160. Id. at 1150-51.
161. Id. at 1149.
162. Id. at 1150 (emphasis in original).
163. Martin Linen is also noteworthy as an illustration of the danger of joining civil
and criminal contempt. Where the two are joined, courts will review both cases on
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In another civil contempt action, United States v. Work Wear
Corp.,64 the defendant was charged with failure to meet a divestiture
schedule contained in a prior consent decree.' 65 The defendant had
been seeking a favorable tax ruling in regard to the divestiture. Proof
of the wilfulness of the delay would have been difficult, so the
Government sought only civil contempt. The court found contempt,
and ordered the defendant to comply within five months or face a
cumulative daily fine of $5,000.166
Although Work Wear did not involve any difficult issues of
interpretation, it illustrates the value of civil contempt enforcement.
Since the government does not have to prove specific intent, there is a
greater chance of successful enforcement. This in itself makes the
terms of consent decrees more meaningful: the corporations are more
likely to believe that technicalities will not stand in the way of enforc-
ing compliance with the decree. On the other hand, the reluctance of
the courts to relax the criminal contempt standards in antitrust cases
raises serious doubts about its deterrent value. Therefore, civil con-
tempt, while more limited in aim, will render the consent decree a
more effective and respected device.
In addition, the courts' flexibility in creating an enforcement order
in civil contempt actions could allow the court to go beyond merely
punishing the wrongdoing; the court could redress injuries suffered by
third parties, if the judge felt that such action was appropriate.' 67 The
government might even begin to anticipate the possibility of third party
relief in a civil contempt action. After the violation, when the govern-
ment petitions for enforcement of the decree, it could describe the
parties injured by noncompliance. Then the injured private parties
simply would have to establish the quantum of damage. Persons
harmed by noncompliance who are outside the group described by the
government could still recover damages, but would have to establish
that defendant's noncompliance caused the harm in addition to proving
damages.
Finally, civil contempt is the most appropriate remedy to achieve
the purposes of the consent decree program. Since consent decrees are
not predicated on any factual record and the defendant admits to no
appeal in the interest of judicial economy. Id. at 1145, 1148. While many courts try to
keep the two distinct, the stricter criminal contempt standard may be applied to both. Id.
at 1149. See In re Merchants' Stock & Grain Co., 223 U.S. 639, 642 (1912).
164. [1975-2] Trade Cas. 60,431, at 66,901 (N.D. Ohio).
165. Id. at 66,903.
166. Id. at 66,904.
167. See note 148 supra.
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statutory violation, it is difficult for a court to penalize noncompliance
unless it is flagrant. Civil contempt allows the government to achieve a
remedy comparable to specific performance of a contract.168 Criminal
penalties, largely defined by statute, cannot be fashioned to redress the
violation and injury with the same specificity.
D. Federal Trade Commission Civil Suits
When a firm has entered into a consent, or cease and desist order
with the FTC, there are additional statutory remedies for noncom-
pliance. Under section 5(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act 169
and section 1 l(I) of the Clayton Act, 170 the FTC has the power to bring
a civil action to enforce the consent order. 171 The FTC's civil remedy
allows a court to assess a defendant up to $10,000 for each separate
violation. There is also provision for punishing, on a daily basis,
"continuing violations" where the defendant allows or encourages the
illegal activity to persist.172 Thus, in addition to the civil and criminal
contempt remedies, the FTC can seek a large punitive fine for viola-
tions of its consent orders. While courts can hear enforcement actions
brought by the FTC on both civil contempt and statutory grounds, 17 3
the statutory remedy provides clearer direction when the issue of the
appropriate sanction arises. Therefore, the Commission more frequent-
ly takes advantage of sections 5(l) and 11 (1) when either remedy might
be appropriate.
The issues in the FTC civil suit closely resemble the issues raised
under civil contempt. The FTC must prove conduct which violated the
168. See note 145 supra and accompanying text. Of course, the contract analogy is
not completely accurate. The consent decree also has a "public purpose" aspect, and
contractual remedies and rules of damages are not responsive to this component.
Nevertheless, the analogy is apposite in that the public deserves no less than strict
compliance with the terms of the decrees.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (1970)).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
171. See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 365 n.6 (1962). Originally the FTC
had a cumbersome enforcement procedure requiring, in effect, proof of three violations.
First, the FTC had to demonstrate conduct which justified the cease-and-desist order;
then it had to prove conduct which violated the explicit terms of the order, for a court of
appeals to enforce the order. Finally, it had to prove a violation (of either the Clayton
Act or the cease-and-desist order) for the "violator to be held in contempt of the court
of appeals enforcement order." United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 493 F.2d 1259,
1266 (1974). See also FTC v. Jantzen, Inc., 386 U.S. 228 (1967).
The 1959 Amendments to the Clayton Act replaced this procedure with the present
statutory remedy, paralleling the amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act
enforcement provisions contained in the 1938 Wheeler-Sea Act. 15 U.S.C. § 21; 15
U.S.C. § 45(l) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(/) (1970)).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (1970)); 15 U.S.C. §
21(1) (1970).
173. 267 F. Supp. at 10-11.
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terms of the decree, and that the defendant was on notice that its
actions violated the terms of the order.' 74 Again, the court's interpre-
tive approach is a major aspect of the notice issue. A court adhering to
a strictly contractual view will require the government to show clear
disobedience of the decree. On the other hand, if a court follows either
a modified contract or purpose analysis, it may require a lesser show-
ing to find a violation. Courts can, and do, cite contempt cases as
precedent for their decisions in civil penalty actions. 175
The most important issue in the FTC action is not whether there has
been a violation of the decree, but whether there has been a single or
"continuing" violation. The line of demarcation is by no means clear.
Congress intended the sanction against continuing violations to reach
situations in which the harm to competition became irreversible if the
practice continued over a period of time. Specifically, it was to cover
situations such as failure to eliminate an unlawful merger, failure to
break up an interlocking directorate, conspiracies to fix prices, and
conspiracies to control production. 17
6
The first case to test the imposition of a cumulative daily fine
arising from a continuing violation of a consent order was United
States v. Beatrice Foods Co. 177 Under the terms of a 1956 consent
decree, Beatrice was not to acquire "directly or indirectly, through
subsidiaries or otherwise, any interest in" a dairy. 178 Subsequently,
Beatrice acquired several distributorships from Maple Island dairies,
and the FTC contended that there was a continuing violation for 780
days and asked for a total fine of $156,000. The defendant argued that
only a single violation had occurred because there had only been one
"acquisition." The Eighth Circuit, however, held that the word "ac-
quire" must mean "acquire and hold," since any other construction
would render the order meaningless.' 79
In Beatrice the issue was not whether there had been a violation,
but rather which penalty was appropriate. To determine the proper
remedy the court used a purpose or modified contract analysis, looking
to factors other than the actual wording of the decree. For example,
Beatrice had proved itself to be in bad faith even before the litigation
began. In prior acquisitions Beatrice had sought FTC approval; in the
174. See United States v. Standard Distrib., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 7 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
175. E.g., United States v. ITT Continental Banking Co., 485 F.2d 16, 18 (10th Cir.
1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 223 (1975); United States v. Standard Distrib., Inc., 267 F. Supp.
7, 10-11 (N.D. I11. 1967).
176. 96 CONG. REC. 3026-27 (1950).
177. 493 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 961 (1975).
178. Id. at 1262. See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
179. 493 F.2d at 1269-71.
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present transaction it remained silent. 80 Going beyond a strict contrac-
tual analysis, the court noted that this was the type of experimentation
with disobedience that consent decrees sought to prevent.' 81
In United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co. ,182 the Supreme
Court approved the Beatrice approach. Continental was subject to a
1962 consent decree which forbade it from acquiring any part of
any concern engaged in the production of bread. Before the ten year
limit in the decree had expired, Continental acquired three bakeries.
The FTC sought cumulative daily fines. The Supreme Court reversed
the Tenth Circuit, and held that the term "acquisition" may entail a
"continuing violation."' 183 The Court construed "acquire" to mean
both "obtaining and retaining" other bakery assets.184 It cited as
support United States v. du Pont185 in which the word "acquire," as
used in the Clayton Act, was interpreted to mean "acquire and hold,"
and noted that "acquire" is an antitrust term of art which necessarily
implies retention. 186
After dealing with the interpretation issue, the Court examined the
propriety of the daily fine. Justice Brennan noted that Congress' intent
in fashioning the continuing violation remedy was to reach those
instances in which the detrimental effect to the public, and the advan-
tage to the violator, continues and increases over a period of time,
leaving no way to eradicate the effects of the violation after it has
begun. 187 Continental's acquisition had eliminated competitors and
naturally increased its share of the market. A single fine was clearly
inadequate since it would constitute a mere cost of growth. But
Continental could not overlook a cumulative daily fine so easily. For
that reason, the Court found the cumulative penalty appropriate. 88
In summary, civil enforcement action under the Federal Trade
Commission Act Section 5(l) and Clayton Section 1 l(l) are resolved in
much the same manner as civil contempt. The new issue that arises for
interpretive analysis is the appropriate fine to levy against violators to
insure effective enforcement.
180. Id. at 1264.
181. Id. at 1269.
182. 420 U.S. 223 (1975). See text accompanying notes 65-77 supra.
183. 420 U.S. at 243.
184. Id. at 240.
185. 353 U.S. 586, 596-97 (1957).
186. 420 U.S. at 240-41.
187. Id. at 231.
188. Id. at 232-33. "[I]f violation of an order prohibiting 'acquiring' assets were
treated as a single violation, any deterrent effect would be entirely undermined, and the
penalty would be converted into a minor tax upon a violation which could reap large
financial benefits to the perpetrator." Id. at 232.
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E. Effective Sanctions for Noncompliance
Regardless of whether courts employ a contract or purpose analysis
in the interpretation of ambiguous consent decree provisions, com-
pliance ultimately hinges upon the effectiveness of the sanction im-
posed. After the court establishes that the defendant has failed to
comply with the terms of the consent decree, the judge has broad
discretion (within the bounds of the relief sought by the government) to
determine the appropriate penalty.' 89 Citation for criminal contempt,
as rare as it is, can result in a stiff punitive fine and/or imprisonment of
the officers responsible for the offending action. '90 A court which finds
the defendant in civil contempt may order imprisonment and/or a daily
fine until the order is carried out. 191
Finally, the penalty in an FTC civil action is a single fine and/or a
daily cumulative penalty.' 92 Whether a single fine, daily fine, or
imprisonment is appropriate depends on a number of factors related to
the proper functioning of the antitrust laws. Different criteria are
relevant, depending upon the nature of the action and the circum-
stances of each case.
Generally, the court's primary concern will be its purpose in
imposing the penalty. In a criminal contempt action there has been
proof of wilful misconduct by the defendant. The fine must be suffi-
ciently severe to vindicate the authority of the court, and to deter the
defendant and other parties from similar experiments with disobedi-
ence. In a civil contempt action, the fine may be less severe because its
purpose is to insure the defendant's compliance. An FTC action
combines elements of both civil and criminal contempt, since it is
designed to punish disobedience and to coerce compliance.
If a court emphasized the criminal contempt aspect of an FTC
action it would be justified in imposing a much stiffer fine than in a
civil contempt proceeding. But, if a similar action were brought under
189. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 229 n.6; United
States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 438 (1974); United States v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 485 F.2d 16, 21 (1973).
190. See United States v. Schine, 125 F. Supp. 734 (W.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 260 F.2d
552 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 934 (1959).
191. See Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947); Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d
66, 70 (1st Cir 1946); cf. United-States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947) (lump sum
fine ordered for criminal contempt and civil contempt in same proceeding).
192. See United States v. Ancorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd, 516 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1975) ($204,200); United States v. Bostic, 336 F. Supp.
1312, 1321 (D.S.C.), aff'd mem., 473 F.2d 1388 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973) ($80,000); United States v. Americana Corp., [1965] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
9701.40 (D.C. Md.) ($100,000).
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the FTC statute, the court should also look to other factors. Some of
these have been identified by Judge Friendly: "The size of the penalty
should be based on a number of factors including [1] the good or bad
faith of the defendants, [2] the injury to the public and [3] the defend-
ant's ability to pay." ' 193 Courts have also considered [4] the "total
amounts of the payments received by the defendant in violation of the
FTC Order .... ",194 These criteria have a broader application to
other civil contempt suits, as well.
Reexamining the dual nature of the decree-contract and judicial
order-explains these four factors and their relative importance in
determining the size of the penalty. If a consent decree is deemed a
judicial order, the violation is disobedience to a lawful court order and
any sanction should be measured on the basis of the defendant's bad
faith. On the other hand, where the decree is considered a contract, the
damage award should be sufficient to put the injured party in the
position he would have been in had the contract been performed. Since
the other party to the contract is the government, as representative of
the public, the damage translates into the second factor identified by
Friendly-injury to the public. Thus, a strict contract theorist would
conclude that the defendant is liable to the extent that his conduct
caused the public harm. The practical problems with such a measure of
damages are obvious. The tangible economic harm is difficult to
measure in the context of the total economy, and it is difficult to assign
it a monetary value. One court, in the context of imposing a fine as
compensation for an injured third party, has interpreted ITT Continen-
tal Baking as equating "public harm with the violator's profits during
the violation."' 195 This simplifies the calculation considerably.
The third and fourth criteria, the defendant's ability to pay and the
income resulting from the violation, are probably the most concrete.
They are also, to an extent, interrelated. A large profit resulting from a
violation can greatly enhance the defendant's ability to pay. A smaller,
or nonexistent profit could have a negligible effect on the firm's ability
to pay; also, losses in another business area could offset profits
resulting from the violation. In this situation the violation profits could
be large, but the ability to pay small.
The court will have to balance the ability to pay against the gravity
and magnitude of the violation. This balancing may involve several
193. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414,438 (2d Cir. 1974) (enumeration
added).
194. United States v. Ancorp Nat'l Servs., 367 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (1973), aff'd, 516
F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1975).
195. United States v. Papercraft Corp., 540 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1976).
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considerations, such as projected firm earnings, capital structure, tax
arrangements, and the probable deterrent effect of various sanctions.
Where the profit from the violation constitutes the only significant
increment in corporate earnings, that figure (or something near it)
could be the fine, under an unjust enrichment theory. Where the
violation profits are indeterminate, or where they do not represent the
only significant earnings increase, the court should look primarily to
the firm's ability to pay and set the fine at a figure large enough to
deter future violations.
Economic theory may further explain why it is valuable to consider
the defendant's ability to pay in setting a fine. Economists Breit and
Elzinga argue that the present system of antitrust penalties should be
replaced with a monetary fine equal to 25 percent of the defendant's
pretax profit for each year in which it engaged in anticompetitive
conduct. 196 Such a massive fine would cause risk averse corporate
managers to be deterred from conduct which even approaches a viola-
tion. 197 In the context of enforcement actions, using the firm's profits
to determine the appropriate fine has an appealing logic. The defend-
ant's ability to pay is probably the most significant criterion because it
provides the most "efficient" method to arrive at a figure that will be
large enough to deter the firm, but not so large as to put it into
insolvency. 98 Just as the courts developed an intermediary position in
decree interpretation, so they should lessen emphasis on the bad faith
and public harm aspects of the decree and focus on the more practical
considerations.
As Breit and Elzinga recognize, the effectiveness of the sanction
depends on the impact it has on management's decision whether to
continue its challenged activity. Courts have often used the cumulative
daily fine to coerce management to take a new course of action, in both
FTC suits and contempt actions.
In United States v. Schine, the district court found the defendants
guilty of criminal contempt and imposed total daily fines of
$73,000.'99 Affirming the penalty, the Second Circuit agreed that the
statute of limitations was not a bar to this contempt remedy:
[A]lithough the initial acts in contempt of the decree occurred
prior to the statutory period, the "illegal" conditions which
196. Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic
Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 693, 711 (1973).
197. "The risk averse person will prefer the large probability of the small loss to the
small probability of the large loss. The risk preferrer, on the other hand, will prefer the
small probability of the large loss to the larger probability of the smaller loss." Id. at 699.
198. Id. at 712-13.
199. United States v. Schine, 270 F.2d at 555.
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they created continued up to the date of the order to show
cause and resulted in what might be called "continuing con-
tempts. '20
The circuit court upheld the trial court's findings that the defendant
wilfully violated the terms of the decree, and that punitive measures
were appropriate to vindicate the authority of the court. 20 1 The court
relied heavily on the purpose of the enforcement proceeding when
setting the fine, and it is interesting to note that the penalty was
identical to the FTC remedy: a cumulative daily fine.
A cumulative daily fine was also imposed in United States v.
Work Wear Corp.,202 where the court set a prospective cumulative fine
of $5,000 per day to commence on a specified date in the future in case
the defendant failed to comply with the decree. 20 3
Unfortunately, it is still questionable whether the existing penalties
are sufficient to secure compliance. In United States v. Papercraft
Corp., 204 the defendant failed to divest itself of a subsidiary within the
timetable agreed upon in the consent decree. The trial judge found that
Papercraft had acted in bad faith, and in an attempt to disgorge a part
of the $5.3 million profit, fined the company $3,817,500. At a special
evidentiary hearing on the propriety of the fine, the judge concluded:
In considering Papercraft's financial ability to pay, and the
harm caused by the delay, the degree of bad faith, and the
benefit received by Papercraft, we do not think that the
penalty assessed should be the maximum, however, it must
be large enough to deter Papercraft and anyone else in the
future from showing as little concern as Papercraft did for the
need to meet the FTC timetable. °5
IV. CONCLUSION
While the nature of consent decrees and orders remains partly
shrouded in mystery, the effect of such negotiated settlements on the
enforcement of antitrust laws is slowly emerging. Third parties cannot
use the settlement for their own suits and, until very recently, they had
little input into fashioning decrees. For its part, the government is
bound by the decree for as long as it is effective since the decree has
res judicata effect and modification of the decree is extremely difficult.
200. 260 F.2d at 555-56.
201. Id. at 555, 557.
202. [1975-2] Trade Cas. 60,431, at 66,901 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
203. Id. at 66,904. In a number of FTC cases the total fines have ranged well over
$100,000. See, e.g., United States v. Ancorp. Nat'l Servs., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1221
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 516 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1975) ($204,200); United States v. America-
na Corp., [1965] 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 9701.40 (D.C. Md.) (judgment for $16,000;
fine of $100,000).
204. [1975] Trade Cas. 60,314, at 66,254 (W.D. Pa.).
205. Id. at 66,263.
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Lack of enforcement has led to widespread contravention of decree
terms. While there are indications that the government intends to
enforce the terms of outstanding decrees, there is very little precedent
in the area. Notwithstanding this handicap, a proceeding brought by
the government to force compliance with decree terms has much to
recommend it. A civil contempt action brought by the Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division can secure compliance with decree terms by
imposing sanctions too large to be ignored as a cost of business.
Much depends, however, on the manner in which the courts con-
strue and interpret the ambiguous terms of consent degrees and orders.
If the court adopts a strict contract approach, evidence will be
restricted to the four corners of the document. On the other hand, a
more expansive modified contract approach would allow the court to
view the circumstances surrounding the entry of the consent decree.
Such an approach would enable the court to interpret the decree more
accurately by permitting consideration of the economic situation sur-
rounding the adoption of the decree. This is why it is disappointing that
the Supreme Court in HT Continental Baking has recently reaffirmed
the contract approach. Decisions such as this only frustrate the gov-
ernment's efforts to enforce consent decrees through contempt pro-
ceedings.
SCOTT F. SERAZIN
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